INTRODUCTION
The movement for disability rights in the United States is grounded on a bedrock commitment to empowering the individual with autonomy and independence. Despite this foundation, a sharp line has been drawn by much of the disability advocacy community when it comes to the autonomy of a mentally competent terminally ill patient to choose a more peaceful death through aid in dying. This exercise of autonomy has largely been opposed by the disability advocacy community. This Article proposes that given the common principles shared by these two social justice movements and evidence from two decades of open practice in the United States that shows that no risk arises for people with disabilities when aid in dying is available, it is time for the disability advocacy community to reexamine and evolve its position on aid in dying. This evolution has the potential to benefit both advocacy communities. of these models focused on the limitations of disabled people and paid scant attention to external factors, which created barriers to integration into society. 6 Through the medical model lens, disability was seen as something unfortunate that befell a person and prevented a fulfilling life. 7 Under this view, many people with a wide range of disabilities were housed in institutional settings, often against their wishes.
8
They were not empowered to make basic choices about where they lived, for how long, or with whom they lived. 9 Family members and health care providers were often the decision-makers in the lives of people with disabilities, despite the fact that living with chronic disability necessarily makes those people experts about their bodies and best-equipped to make informed decisions about their lives and health care. 10 Through the economic model lens, functional barriers and a lack of adequate work skills were regarded as obstacles preventing disabled people from achieving independence.
11
This lens deemed the physical constraints of disability as the reason that disabled people could not support themselves financially or achieve increased participation in society. 12 By the late 1960s and early 1970s, following in the footsteps of the civil rights and women's rights movements, disability advocates demanded change. 13 They created a civil rights model of disability.
14 An oft-heard rallying cry of the movement was: "Nothing about us without us." 8 Id. at 233. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 234. 11 See Jeon & Haider-Markel, supra note 6, at 216. 12 Id. 13 Id. at 218-19. 14 Id. at 219. 15 See JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 3-4 (1998). See also Nothing About Us Without Us, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Nothing_About_Us_Without_Us (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (discussing how "Nothing About Us The movement grew out of a reaction to the medical and economic models that identified disability as a personal defect rather than an environmental/societally constructed limitation. 16 A central contention was that marginalization of the disabled was a "failure of a structured social environment to adjust to the needs and aspirations of disabled citizens rather than from the inability of a disabled individual to adapt to the demands of society." 17 This perspective viewed disability as no different from other bodily attributes that sometimes precipitated discrimination, such as gender and skin color. 18 It shifted emphasis from the individuals' differences to the failings of the external environment and society to accommodate those differences. 19 
B. The Independent Living Movement
The Independent Living Movement ("ILM") launched an empowering, personcentered approach to disability: "The independent living perspective views people with disabilities not as patients or clients but as active and responsible consumers. Independent living proponents reject traditional treatment approaches as offensive and disenfranchising and demand control over their own lives."
20
The first Center for Independent Living ("CIL") was established in Oakland in 1972. It "emphasized personal independence, consumer sovereignty, and consumer choice; it became a Without Us!" is a slogan used to communicate the idea that no policy should be decided by any representative without the full and direct participation of members of the group(s) affected by that policy; the term in its English form came into use in disability activism during the 1990s). 16 CILs (or "ILCs," Independent Living Centers) continue to advance these objectives: "A hallmark of CIL service delivery that remains a cornerstone today is the value of personal choice and empowerment in all aspects of service delivery."
See generally

22
The ILM sought to vest autonomy and decision-making power in the disabled. CILs are structured to "maximize the leadership, empowerment, independence, and productivity of individuals with disabilities to integrate these individuals into the mainstream of American society." 23 Consistent with these goals, CILs were to be run and directed primarily by people with disabilities; board and staff were to be comprised of a majority of people with disabilities.
24
Instead of having a caregiver, family member, or physician dictate care and treatment, the person with the disability would retain the autonomy to make decisions about care and treatment and to hire and manage treatment providers.
25
Advocacy to eradicate the practice of segregating people with disabilities in institutions, often in substandard conditions and against their will, was pursued. The goal was to facilitate and normalize integrated, community-based living with personal assistance and resources to facilitate independence.
26
Recognizing that there are many ways people with disabilities may want or need to interact with others to achieve integration, appreciation of interdependence has emerged.
27
This approach continues to emphasize respect for individual autonomy, empowerment, and decision-making. 21 White et al., supra note 7, at 235. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 See Mackelprang & Salsgiver, supra note 20, at 12. 26 See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 596 (1999) (discussing the right to be free from undue institutionalization and to live in the community). 27 See White et al., supra note 7, at 237. 
C. Landmark Legislation Recognizing Autonomy of People with Disabilities
The enactment of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, in 1990,
28
"signified a national consensus that people with disabilities are fully capable of, and should be allowed to, exercise control of their lives in the mainstream of our society."
29
States also adopted strong legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities. 30 Some disability activists express the view that these legislative efforts have been insufficient and ineffective.
31
D. Court Cases Respecting the Autonomy of Disabled Persons
Law and policy have evolved in the direction of preserving the autonomy of disabled persons. This can be seen, for example, in the context of conservatorship and guardianship, where courts have been careful to limit the appointment of conservators and guardians for people with disabilities.
32
In doing so, courts may observe policy preferences articulated by the legislature: "to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of a protected 28 The Americans with Disabilities Act reflects a national commitment to equal opportunities for individuals with disabilities, including the right to have access to public streets, public transportation, schools, public services, privately owned places of public accommodation, and places of employment. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § § 12111-12181 (2012). Similarly, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act reflects the national commitment to appropriate education for students with disabilities. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § § 1400-1450 (2012). 29 They may thus feel bound to "consider whether arrangements less intrusive than a conservatorship will adequately protect an individual's property as well as her autonomy." 34 Similarly, courts have denied petitions for appointment of a guardian for persons with disabilities. For example, such a petition was denied in a case involving an adult with Down Syndrome.
35
The court rejected the usurpation of autonomy that guardianship would have imposed. 36 Instead, less draconian measures and supports were to be preferred, including reliance on a support network of family and friends, to preserve as much as possible the autonomy of the disabled person.
37
Less restrictive measures were to be favored because "[t]hese alternative resources enable individuals with disabilities to maintain as much control over their own life decisions as they are capable to make in the least restrictive setting."
38
Even in situations where the disability entails severe mental illness, courts have been careful to preserve autonomy to the maximum extent possible, protecting "the right to participate meaningfully in the course of their treatment, to be free from unnecessary or unwanted medication, and to have their rights to personal autonomy and bodily integrity respected by agents of the state." , her twenty-nine-year-old son/his brother, under New York's Surrogate's Court Procedure Act, finding the disabled individual was "able to work, to travel independently, to exercise self care and management, and to make decisions about his own affairs, albeit at times with assistance and supervision from his family and supportive programs"). 
40
And the Bouvia case, discussed above, exemplifies that courts recognize the right of a severely disabled person to make her own informed decision about treatment, even when respecting her decision could precipitate her death. 41 Thus, it is plain that the evolution of the disability rights movement in the United States has, at its core, the goal of engendering respect for the autonomy of people with disabilities and empowering them with the ability to make informed decisions regarding their lives and how they will live them. These very same principles underlie and animate the movement for end-of-life liberty, which supports a broad variety of end-of-life options, including aid in dying.
E. Background and Evolution of the Movement for End-of-Life Liberty in the United States
Modern medicine can draw out the dying process so long that a patient dying of a terminal illness may feel trapped in a torturous, lingering decline.
42
Sometimes the process of dying takes too long: suffering becomes unbearable, and some patients will want a swifter, more peaceful end. 43 In response to this, advocacy to empower patients with the option of aid in dying began to emerge in the United States. Washington was the first state to put a measure related to aid in dying before its voters, and in 1991 it was nearly adopted. 44 The following year California voters considered a ballot initiative on this issue, 40 Whittington v. Office of Prof'l Regulation, 87 A.3d 489 (Vt. 2013) (nursing home administrator sanctioned by licensing board for forcing a resident to change into a dress despite her wishes to wear a hospital gown, and to be seated despite the individual's desire to stay in bed, overrode patient autonomy in violation of Vermont's Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights) (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 7301 (West 2016)). 41 See Hahn, supra note 17. 42 See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Letting Go: What should medicine do when it can't save your life?, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 2, 2010) ("For all but our most recent history, dying was typically a brief process . . . . These days, swift catastrophic illness is the exception; for most people, death comes only after long medical struggle with an incurable condition."). 43 See, e.g., Kathryn L. which also failed to pass by a small margin. 45 Oregon learned from these campaigns across its borders and tailored its measure to address the concerns of voters that arose in the Washington and California initiative efforts; 46 Oregon enacted the nation's first "Death with Dignity Act" in 1994 ("Dignity Act") 47 by a margin of 51% to 49%. 48 Oregon's Dignity Act established tightly controlled procedures under which competent, terminally ill adults may obtain a prescription for medication that they ingest to bring about a peaceful death. 49 In order for a patient to be eligible, the attending physician must, among other things, determine that the patient is an Oregon resident, is mentally competent, and confirm the patient's diagnosis and prognosis. 50 To qualify as having a "terminal disease," a person must have "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months." 51 The attending physician must inform the patient of his or her diagnosis and prognosis, the risks and probable results of taking the medication, and alternatives to aid in dying, including hospice care and pain relief.
52
A second "consulting" physician must confirm the attending physician's medical opinion.
53
Once a request from a qualifying patient has been properly documented and witnessed, and all waiting periods have expired, the attending physician may prescribe, but not administer, medication that the patient may ingest to bring about a peaceful death. Many articles published in medical and legal journals discuss the data and its implications.
60
As discussed below, some disability advocates have taken a careful look at the data and been vocal in recognizing that no evidence of harm to people with disabilities can be seen when aid in dying becomes an openly available option.
On a parallel track to the efforts in the political sphere to establish access to aid in dying, advocates sought relief in court: patients and physicians challenged laws 55 § 127.865 (3.11). These cases asserted that liberty and equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protected the right of a competent terminally ill individual to choose aid in dying. 62 Two federal courts of appeals, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed that statutes construed to prevent patients from exercising this option were unconstitutional. 63 Although the Supreme Court reversed these decisions, it left the door open to both future legislative reform and a future successful federal constitutional claim.
64
The core of the plaintiffs' argument in these cases, and in similar cases subsequently litigated in state courts under state constitutions, 65 was that the choice of a dying patient about how much suffering to endure in the final throes of terminal illness was a profoundly personal decision, which would be informed by the individual's most deeply held values and beliefs, and thus was deserving of protection from control by the government. 66 The patient, it was argued, should have the autonomy to make his or her own informed decision about this profound matter. 67 
F. Disability Views of End-of-Life Liberty
Some disability advocates recognize that the principles animating support for disability rights are identical to those which animate support for end-of-life liberty. "How a person faces their own death is a private and intimate decision that should be made by that person and that person alone. Nobody else, particularly the state, should have the power to take away that most private and intimate decision." [I]nterests in autonomy and self-determination are the cornerstones of the disability rights movement . . . the movement has successfully brought recognition to a broad array of rights for people with disabilities and has established a presumption in our society that disabled individuals should be empowered to make independent decisions about their lives. Amici believe that people with disabilities who are facing imminent death, and who are capable of reasoned and voluntary choice, should be permitted to (choose aid in dying). Emphatically, Amici do not believe that providing this choice to terminally ill, competent adults-including those with disabilities-in any way poses a threat to them or diminishes their significance as valuable members of society. 69 Disability community advocates recognize that across the spectrum of that large community there will be a range of views on the issue: "People with disabilities do not speak with one voice on whether individuals with terminal illnesses should be permitted to end their own suffering with the assistance [of] their physicians and to choose death with dignity." 70 That fact was true nearly twenty years ago when Glucksberg was litigated and it remains true today. In 2015, the Canadian Supreme Court noted that while some people with disabilities oppose aid in dying, others "take the opposite view." 71 Disability advocates supportive of end-of-life liberty assert that their peers who oppose this liberty assume that people with disabilities are not capable of making a rational and voluntary decision about how much suffering to endure prior to death when confronted by death due to the progression of a terminal illness. 72 Further, they argue that this assumption invites the return of a paternalistic view of disabled persons-an attitude which the disability community has worked long and hard to eradicate: "[It] threatens to set back decades of legislative action and social advocacy For decades, individuals with disabilities have had to defend their right to make choices and maintain control over all aspects of their lives. . . . [T]his right to autonomy and self-determination applies with no less force to the most uniquely personal, moral [,] and religious choice of all-the choice of whether to hasten impending death from a terminal condition. 74 Societal pressures may operate differently on those with disabilities than on others. However, the solution is not to ban an end-of-life option; some want the freedom to choose for themselves. Instead, the solution respectful of both the disabled and dying patients is to work to minimize and eradicate disparate treatment of people with disabilities, while respecting the right of competent terminally ill patients to choose a more peaceful death through aid in dying.
II. THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY OPPOSITION TO END-OF-LIFE LIBERTY
As the movement for end-of-life liberty emerged, many disability community advocates became vocal opponents of it. A leading disability rights scholar and advocate characterized this opposition as based on the following reasoning:
[S]ociety has devalued and oppressed people with disabilities, and in a health care system designed to cut costs . . . people with terminal illnesses and other disabilities will be coerced into choosing to end their lives. . . . Disability advocates opposed to aid in dying commonly rely on slippery slope arguments.
76
Some in the disability community-who retain the ability to make their own informed decisions about their bodies, lives, and medical treatmentnonetheless fear that someone would deny them medical care if the law permitted removal of life sustaining treatment from a patient who has lost the capacity to express their wishes and whose wishes are expressed through a surrogate. This apprehension was clear from the events surrounding the medical treatment provided to Terri Schiavo. Many disability advocates opposed the withdrawal of Schiavo's feeding tube, even though her properly authorized surrogate expressed that her wish would be to have it withdrawn. 77 The fear, shared by many persons with disabilities, is that they will be coerced into giving up on life because others devalue their lives or that those who devalue their lives will seek to deny or remove treatment and cause them to die. Those who believe in the right to self-determination in end-of-life medical decision-making must address this fear.
78
One might hope it could be effectively addressed by evidence showing that there is no adverse impact on people with disabilities when aid in dying is openly available. And such evidence is available. The evidence, along with its impact, is discussed below.
III. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM NEARLY TWENTY YEARS OF DATA ABOUT HOW AVAILABILITY OF AID IN DYING IMPACTS PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES?
As noted above, state statutes permitting aid in dying typically require the collection and reporting of a vast amount of data concerning who chooses aid in dying and the motivations for doing so. Close scrutiny has been given to data concerning the practice of aid in dying. Observers have uniformly concluded that and an internationally known disability rights activist, having served as a Special Assistant to U.S. Attorney General Thornburgh, and as Professor at Florida International University. 76 DRO has not received a complaint of exploitation or coercion of an individual with disabilities in the use of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. . . . Complaints have focused on the concern that the Dignity Act might discriminate against persons with disabilities who would seek to make use of the Act but have disabilities which would prevent self-administration, thereby denying these persons the ability to use the Dignity Act. 81 The experience in Oregon has demonstrated that aid in dying puts neither patients nor people with disabilities at risk.
82
A comprehensive report examined the Oregon experience to assess whether vulnerable populations were harmed, and it concluded that there was no evidence of this.
83
Oregon's experience has caused even staunch opponents to acknowledge that continued opposition to such a law can only be based on personal, moral, or religious grounds. The Oregon data, and, more recently, similar data from other states, shows that the dire predictions of those initially opposed to the Dignity Act were unfounded and that the option of aid in dying has not been unwillingly forced upon those who are poor, uneducated, uninsured, or otherwise disadvantaged.
85
In fact, the data shows just the opposite. For example, the reports reflect that patients choosing aid in dying have a high level of education, 86 are overwhelmingly insured (98% of patients opting for aid in dying had either private health insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid) and almost all (92%) were enrolled in hospice care. 87 Furthermore, the data demonstrates that aid in dying is rare: during the first eighteen years this option was openly available in Oregon, only 991 patients chose it. 88 Although there has been a gradual increase in the rate of those opting for aid in dying, the overall rate remains low: in 2015, 218 people received prescriptions, and 50 of those who received the medication did not end up ingesting it.
89
A 2000 survey of Oregon physicians found that they granted one in six requests for aid in dying, and only one in ten requests 90 Interestingly, more than one-third of patients who complete the process of seeking medications for aid in dying do not go on to consume them. 91 Deriving comfort from having the option to control their time of death, these patients ultimately die of their disease without exercising that control. 92 Observers studying aid in dying in Oregon have concluded that the law poses no risk to patients. Leading scholars have concluded: "I [was] worried about people being pressured to do this . . . . But this data confirms . . . that the policy in Oregon is working. There is no evidence of abuse or coercion, or misuse of the policy." 93 Indeed, rather than posing a risk to patients or the medical profession, the open availability of aid in dying has galvanized significant improvements in the care of those terminally ill and dying in Oregon. Oregon physicians report that since aid in dying has been openly available, they have worked hard to improve end-of-life care, taking educational courses on how to treat pain in the terminally ill and how to recognize depression and other psychiatric disorders, and more frequently referring patients to hospice. 94 Surveyed on their efforts to improve end-of-life care since aid in dying became available, 30% of responding physicians had increased referrals to hospice care and 76% made efforts to improve their knowledge of pain management. 
96
In addition to the improvement of end-of-life care, the option of aid in dying has psychological benefits for both the terminally ill and the healthy.
97
The availability of the option of aid in dying gives the terminally ill autonomy, control, and choice-the overwhelming motivational factor behind the decision to request assistance in dying. 98 Healthy Oregonians know that if they ever face a terminal illness, they will have this additional end-of-life option.
Furthermore, the data demonstrates that the option of aid in dying has spurred improvements in end-of-life care and benefited all terminally ill Oregonians.
99
A central argument against allowing patients access to aid in dying is that certain risks would arise if the option were available, such as subtle coercion, undue influence, and deprivation of autonomy. 99 Smith et al., supra note 82, at 445-49. 100 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) ("We have recognized . . . the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations."). 101 See Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 88, at 409. Other reasons have been offered which put to rest the fear that availability of aid in dying will put patients at risk. For example, one commentator studied the reluctance of patients and providers to withdraw feeding tubes, an option legal in every state. Id. at 399. He concluded that the data show that feeding tubes are over utilized, demonstrating reluctance to take steps that will precipitate death, and that such reluctance will apply in context of aid in dying. Id. 
103
Some disability rights groups, and other organizations with commitment to both disability rights and the civil liberties of the terminally ill, have taken a close look at this data and begun to advocate for expanding end-of-life liberty. The American Public Health Association, which takes keen interest in public health, patient rights, and disability rights, gave careful consideration to the datain particular whether it reflected any danger to persons with disabilities-and adopted a policy supportive of aid in dying in 2008. 104 More recently, ALS advocates have begun openly supporting the right of terminally ill persons to be empowered to choose a more peaceful death through aid in dying. dying, while being careful to recognize disability concerns, and it filed an amicus brief in a case seeking to expand end-of-life liberty in New York. 106 Others, despite the evidence, continue to oppose this position. 107 It is possible that they do so because of the phenomenon known as "cognitive-dissonance avoidance," which commentators have observed "will steel individuals to resist empirical data that either threatens practices they revere or bolsters ones they despise, particularly when accepting such data would force them to disagree with individuals they respect." 108 In light of this, reconsideration of the issue by respected disability advocates, and the emergence of support from them, seems potentially useful to evolving the polarization on this issue. Researchers have observed that "when subjects see the argument they are disposed to reject being made by the advocate whose values they share . . . polarization shrinks to the point of disappearing." 109 "Having a principled debater whose cultural worldview matches that of the audience is an important part of assisting the audience in crediting the version of the facts that a policymaker believes to be true." 
IV. RECONCILING THE DISABILITY COMMUNITY ADVOCACY WITH THE END-OF-LIFE LIBERTY MOVEMENT
In light of the common principles underlying the movements for disability rights and end-of-life liberty, it is incongruous that these movements do not often actively support each other. Failure to respect the autonomy of an individual to make their own informed decisions about their own bodies, lives, and course of medical treatment jeopardizes respect for such autonomy across a range of applications. If it is acceptable to deny the autonomy of a competent terminally ill patient to choose how much suffering to endure prior to death, does it become conceivable to deny the autonomy of a person with a disability to choose how much medical treatment to pursue regardless how extreme the disability? This is a real risk, and one that the disability community ought to take seriously.
Fortunately, signs of an emerging evolution of views can be seen. Organizations with longstanding commitment to both patient rights and disability rights-ranging from the American Public Health Association, to the American Civil Liberties Union, to groups representing people with disabilities with a rapid trajectory to death such as ALS-are taking a close look at the evidence emerging from the laboratory of the states and concluding that the evidence shows that the rights of terminally ill patients are properly respected when end-of-life liberty is expanded, and that doing so poses no threat to people with disabilities. Accordingly, support for aid in dying is growing among civil liberties organizations concerned with both the rights of the disabled and the terminally ill. As noted by the New York Civil Liberties Union in an amicus brief filed in a case seeking to establish access to aid in dying in New York: "[I]t is important to acknowledge that certain bedrock principles, including both personal and medical autonomy, underlie both the disability rights movement and the end-of-life rights movement." 120
